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SENTENCING HEARING							
Thursday, April 6, 2017							
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Detroit, Michigan 1 2 Thursday, April 6, 2017 3 4 THE CLERK: Case Number 16-20098, United 5 6 States of America versus Khalil Abu-Rayyan. 7 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 8 MR. WATERSTREET: Good afternoon. Ronald 9 Waterstreet on behalf of the United States. 10 THE COURT: Welcome. 11 MR. SHANKER: Good afternoon, your Honor. 12 Todd Shanker on behalf of Mr. Khalil Abu-Rayyan who is 13 standing to my right. THE COURT: Welcome. This is a continuation 14 15 of a sentencing hearing that has been taking place over a period of time. I believe we have arrived at a point 16 17 where the Court simply has to announce its determination 18 of a sentence. 19 Is there anything that either side wishes to state 2.0 before the Court makes its ruling? 21 MR. WATERSTREET: No, your Honor. 22 MR. SHANKER: Nothing further, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. In this case the 24 parties have agreed upon the advisory guideline range that 25 applies to this case, and that constitutes a range of 15

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to 21 months in length. The defendant asked the Court to consider imposing a sentence at the low end of that guideline range of 15 months. The government asks for the Court to grant an upward variance to impose a term of eight years, is it -- eight years for the violation.

The Court is directed by the statute to consider the advisory guideline range in this case, and I have, indeed, considered that range, along with the factors that are enumerated at Section 3553(a) in deciding on an appropriate sentence. I think it would serve the discussion of the Court's consideration in this matter at least by providing some background.

In this case, when Mr. Abu-Rayyan was 12 years old, he was referred to counseling because he told his teacher that he dreamed that he had a gun and shot everyone in class.

While in school, he had experience of assaultive behavior which resulted in his suspension from school on three or four occasions for fighting. At age 19, he was in a fight with his brother which resulted in the police being called, and Mr. Abu-Rayyan be detained for some 18 hours.

At the of age 17, Mr. Abu-Rayyan began using marijuana, and between the ages of 19 and 21, he admitted he was smoking between 10 to 15 marijuana blunts everyday.

Mr. Abu-Rayyan reports that his childhood was devoid of abuse, and his necessities of life were provided, but he was bullied by his peers.

As early as November of 2014, the defendant re-tweeted, liked and commented on acts of terror and martyrdom on behalf of the foreign terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, formally Al-Qaeda Iraq, commonly referred to as ISIL. His conduct included seeking out internet links to gruesome ISIL videos, posting them on his Twitter accounts, and posting comments after viewing the executions and killings depicted in the ISIL videos.

The propaganda on his Twitter account included videos of a Jordanian fighter pilot being burned alive, handcuffed people being executed by being thrown from a high-rise building, the beheading of a Christian in Egypt and news of ISIL victories.

On January 22, 2015, the defendant added to his favorites on his Twitter account a photograph of a person about to have his throat slit with a knife.

On February 19, 2015, the FBI found a photograph uploaded on the defendant's Twitter account, showing him dressed in camouflage with two similarly dressed individuals, holding a semi-automatic handgun in his right hand, and making an ISIL symbol with the left index

finger.

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On October 5, 2015, the defendant purchased a .22 caliber revolver from a sporting good store. In response to a question on the form required by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives whether he was unlawful user or addicted to marijuana, the defendant falsely stated that he was not.

On October 7, 2015, Detroit Police pulled the defendant over for speeding. They found the .22 caliber revolver in the car, along were four bags of marijuana.

Mr. Abu-Rayyan admitted he did not have a concealed weapon license, and he was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon in an automobile and possession of marijuana.

Following his arrest, he replaced his cell phone and downloaded more disturbing images, including the ISIL flag, people with firearms with the ISIL flag, people who appeared to be burned alive. His wallpaper on his new phone was a picture of a man making an ISIL symbol with his left hand while holding a severed head of a woman with his right hand.

On November 15th, the defendant attempted to purchase another firearm from a different sporting good retailer. Again, he lied on the ATF form, and denied that he was a marijuana user. Due to his pending criminal case, he was not allowed to purchase the firearm.

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Also on November 15th, he and another individual went to the local firing range, rented an AK-47 and AR-15 with which they practiced shooting.

In the late November 2015, the defendant tweeted photographs of himself firing an AK-47 and an AR-15 type rifle. He captured -- or he captioned one of the photographs as sahwat hunting, sahwat being a term for Iraquis who oppose ISIL.

The defendant admits that at the time that he practiced using these two military type rifles, he was viewing and downloading ISIS propaganda.

On December 12, 2015, the defendant sent his brother a message that this would be perfect time to do a istigahhadi, being martyrdom or suicide operation.

December of 2015, he also began communicating with a FBI undercover employee on social media about ISIS. He consistently expressed his support for ISIL, and his desire to commit a martyrdom operation. He provided detailed descriptions of his plans to behead people and skin them like sheep.

By mid-December 2015, he claims that he fell in love with the undercover employee posing as Ghadda, and that he believe he was engaged to be married to her.

During his conversations with the undercover employee, whom Abu-Rayyan called Jannah, the defendant

stated his desire to shoot up a church near his place of employment. He said that he had an AK-47 with a 40 round magazine, and described the firearm as a type of machine gun ISIL fighters carry. He told the undercover employee that his father discovered the items that he had in his the car to carry out the church shooting, including the AK-47, bullets and a mask. He told the undercover employee that he practiced loading and unloading the gun, and he was targeting the church because many people attend the church, and the church members were barred from carrying firearms inside. Investigators located a church matching the description given by Mr. Abu-Rayyan in his posts which could accommodate up to 6,000 people.

When the undercover employee asked the defendant if he regretted not committing this shooting at the church, he responded, honestly, I regret not doing it. If I can't do jihad in the middle -- it appears that it would Middle East, I would do jihad over here.

In January of 2016, he told the undercover employee that he wanted to conduct a martyrdom operation by killing a police officer who arrested him while that officer was in the hospital.

In January of 2016, the defendant also told the undercover employee that it was his dream to behead someone, and that he was excited about shootings and

death.

January 15, 2016, the defendant pled guilty to the state charge arising out of his arrest, pleading to possession of marijuana, and he was pending trial on the concealed weapons charge. The state case involved the same conduct involved in this case.

On February 26, 2016, he withdrew his guilty plea to the charge of possessing marijuana to enter a plea of guilty to the reduce charge of carrying a concealed weapon.

On January 18th, the defendant and the undercover employee had the following conversation, quote, and even my dad, he knows that I support the dawlah, state, a known reference to the Islamic State or ISIS, you know. He tells me everyday, you know, be careful. Watch your posting. Be careful who you talk to. You know, I told him numerous time that I wanted to make jihad. I want to do an istishhadi or martyrdom or suicide. I told my dad that, and he doesn't support it, of course, but he tells me all the time I have to listen to him first.

On January 25, 2016, the undercover employee known as Jannah told the defendant that she wanted to die for the sake of Allah because of, quote, seeing my sisters and brothers and young women die in Syria and Iraq like that. The undercover employee also told the defendant that jihad

is my dream.

In January of 2016, the defendant told the undercover employee that Satan speaks to him at night by telling him to burn people alive, tie them up and cut their tongues.

February 2, 2016, the defendant told the undercover employee that he was thinking about hanging himself with a rope. The undercover employee told him it's forbidden for a person to take his own life, but added, like I told you before, you know, when it's for the sake of Allah, when it's jihad, or when it's on our creed for a cause, that's the only time Allah allows it, but not to put your life to waste and just hang yourself like you say you want to do, and that conversation the defendant tells the undercover employee, I would not like to hurt somebody else.

February 4, 2016, the investigators executed search warrants at the defendant's residence and place of employment, and his cell phone and computer were seized. Investigators did not find any weapons or ammunition.

On February 4th, a criminal complaint entered in this case charging the defendant with possessing a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance.

On the 16th of February, the defendant was charged in a two count indictment for making a false statement to

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acquire a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(a)(6), and possession of a firearm by a probative person in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3).

On March 16th and 24, 2016, the defendant's expert witness Lyle Danuloff, conducted clinical interviews of the defendant in the Wayne County Jail at the defendant's request, also interviewed the defendant's father and stepmother. In conducting his the evaluation, he reviewed a number of other materials, including conversations between the defendant and the undercover employee.

During that interview, the defendant's father made false statements and denied that his son had any trouble in school and falsely claimed that the defendant graduated high school without any suspensions or disciplinary actions against him.

March 25, 2016, in a letter addressed to the Court, Dr. Danuloff opined that the defendant was competent to assist in his own defense.

Dr. Danuloff issued his psychological evaluation, concluding that the defendant did not exhibit any indications of severe psychological disorder or dysfunction, and that report also found that the defendant has a dependent personality disorder and a cannabis dependence.

At the bond hearing, Dr. Danuloff testified,

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proffered his opinion on the defendant's competency and safety of the community upon his release. The Court ruled that Dr. Danuloff is not board certified as a forensic psychologist, and was not qualified to testify on the question of the defendant's potential risk of safety of the community if released on bond.

Dr. Danuloff found that the defendant had a deep sense of shame and remorse for all of his actions, and strongly denied the intentions that his verbal behavior would indicate on the surface. He further found that the defendant was psychologically fixated, immature and lonely as an adolescent with compromised marijuana impacting his judgment.

On March 14, 2016, the defendant was sentenced to two years probation, 80 hours of community service on the state charges, and on April 18th, this Court denied his motion to be released on bond.

This Court also ordered a psychiatric evaluation which was conducted at the Federal Medical Center in Devens, Massachusetts.

Dr. Chad Tillbrook, a forensic psychologist, conducted the court ordered evaluation, and found that the defendant did not reveal any thought or speech disorganization indicative of a psychotic disorder. He did report that the defendant drew parallels between his

interest in watching violent photos and videos produced by terrorists, and is interested in watching adult pornography, nothing more than curiosity and interest of something so different from his life, end quote.

Dr. Tillbrook diagnosed the defendant with an adjustment disorder, mixed anxiety, depressed mood and cannabis use disorder. He found the defendant competent to stand trial.

He also found that the defendant is not presenting with acute psychiatric symptoms, and is not a substantial risk of causing bodily harm to others or serious damage of property to another due to mental illness. Inpatient mental health treatment is not indicated at this time.

So on August 2nd, the Court held a competency hearing. The Court adopted the report from Dr. Tillbrook, finding the defendant competent to stand trial.

The Court heard oral argument on a renewed motion to be release and denied that motion.

The defendant pled guilt to these charges on September 13, 2016, and this -- these violations carried statutory maximum penalties of 10 years. The Probation Department has calculated a guideline range of 15 to 21 months, and the Court has competing requests of a 15 month sentence or a 96 month sentence.

Although sentencing begins with the guideline

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calculation, the Court is required to consider the appropriateness of a guideline sentence, and whether a variance is warranted. For the reasons that I am discussing, the Court does conclude that an upward variance is called for in this case.

The Court must impose a sentence that is sufficient to achieve the statutory purposes of punishment, which includes most importantly here protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant and affording deterrence to criminal conduct. The sentence imposed must not be greater than necessary to achieve these goals. The Court has brought discretion in sentencing, and there's no limitation on the information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant that the Court may consider.

In determining the appropriate sentence here, the Court accepts the government's position that an above guideline sentence is necessary to protect the public, and to deter further conduct, and the Court will address the 3553 factors.

So Section 3553 requires the Court to impose a sentence which is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. Given the defendant's prior conduct, dating back to at least November 2014, in which he expressed his

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support of ISIS, his fascination with murder, beheadings, and savage terrorist attacks, the Court determines that a significant sentence is warranted here.

In addition to his stated support of jihadist activities, the defendant made specific statements to the undercover employee that he planned to kill the police officer who arrested him while he was in the hospital, and that he would shoot up a large church near his place of employment.

He also emailed his brother that this would be a perfect time to do an istishhadi, being a martyrdom or suicide operation.

After he was arrested and tried -- after he was arrested, he tried, but failed to buy another gun illegally, went to the shooting range, fired off an AK-47 and an AR-15, and then posted pictures of himself holding those weapons and making the ISIS gesture.

The Court is persuaded by the government's argument that the defendant cannot be released, at least not in the near future, without posing a serious risk to the public. If released, no one can ensure that he will not buy a firearm or a weapon and carry out an ISIS terrorist attack like the ones that he discussed with the undercover employee.

The defendant argues that when he viewed and

expressed his support for ISIS terrorist activities, and he stated his intention to commit his own ISIS terrorist inspired attacks, these were merely the thoughts of an immature, depressed and marijuana dependent adolescent who has reformed his life and his intentions after spending more than the last year in prison. He claims that his confinement has allowed him to withdraw from drug abuse, and clarify his thought process.

Furthermore, the defendant argues that Dr.

Danuloff and Dr. Tillbrook's evaluations support his claim that he poses no risk to the public.

The Court can't agree with that characterization.

First, as to Dr. Danuloff, the Court previously found that he is not qualified to testify on the issue of the defendant's potential risk of safety to the community, because he's a non-certified forensic psychiatrist, and for other reasons as well as stated on the record by the Court at that bond hearing.

Second, as to Dr. Tillbrook, he did not find the defendant posed a risk -- that he did not find that the defendant posed no risk to the public, only that he did not have a psychological disorder that would create risk of him causing harm to others or that would require inpatient mental health treatment.

In other words, the defendant could very well

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harbor evil intentions and a desire so act on those evil motives, but those intentions are not rooted and or caused by psychological disorder.

Dr. Tillbrook's analysis that the defendant does not suffered from acute psychiatric symptoms is likely of little relief to the parishioners of the church that he stated he would like shoot up, or to the police officer that he planned to kill while the officer was in the hospital. Not all criminal conduct can be explained by psychiatric disorders. In fact, when criminal are deemed insane, they are not held responsible for their criminal activity.

Here, the fact that Dr. Tillbrook found that the defendant was competent to stand trial and did not require inpatient mental health treatment, does not explain away his cell phone screen saver photograph of an ISIS terrorist holding the severed head of a woman by her hair, or the countless other ways he expressed support of ISIL jihadist activities over the past several years.

Blaming the defendant's obsession with ISIL activities on his depression, as he has done in the sentencing memorandum submitted and during oral argument, does not alleviate the Court's concerns about the real risk that he poses to the community if he is released soon.

There may be some correlation between an individual's depression, and that individual's willingness to participate in a martyrdom suicide mission, but the defendant has not convinced the Court that incarceration has allowed him to overcome his depression sufficiently, or that he no longer possesses the threat—poses a threat to the community. It's certainly a good thing that he is no longer using marijuana, because he is confined, but there are no guarantees that he will not return to marijuana use upon his release, or that he would no longer be depressed because of the time he has so far spent in prison.

Also, although it is likely that the defendant's habit of smoking 10 to 15 blunts of marijuana per day impacted his judgment, the defendant has not come forward with any medical information or explanation that would support his attempts to blame marijuana for sparking his affinity for ISIS propaganda.

The Court has carefully considered the video statement that the defendant submitted with his sentencing memorandum, as well as his personal statement that he made at the sentencing hearing, in which he expressed his deep remorse and shame over his criminal conduct, and gave assurances that he never meant to hurt anyone, and never would do so.

In addition, the Court has considered the many letters that the defendant sent to his family members while in prison to show his remorse and rehabilitation. The government points out that there are no letters to the Court written by any others on his behalf asking for leniency.

In his statement to the Court, the defendant said that he purchased the gun solely to protect himself while delivering pizzas in Detroit.

He further stated that he accepted full responsibility for the reckless and foolish things that he said and viewed, but that he never meant any of those things that he said, apparently in regard to his support of ISIS and his intentions to participate in terrorist inspired activities.

The defendant expressed his profuse apologies to his family, and especially to his father, and lamented that he had let them down and deviated from the true meaning of Islam, which he acknowledged is a peaceful religion, having nothing to do with ISIS.

He expressed his view that he had been raised in a good family, and that his father is the epitome of the American dream. The defendant's statement at sentencing that he was raised by good family, living the American dream, makes his choice to view and support ISIL jihad

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propaganda while stating his intentions to shoot up a church and kill a police officer all the more disturbing.

Just as mental illness cannot explain away his conduct, he cannot blame an abusive or neglected childhood for his conduct either.

The defendant's statements that his incarceration over the past year has allowed him to clear his mind, and that he has never posed and will never pose a threat to the public is self-serving, of course, given his current confinement. While the Court certainly hopes that his statements remorse and rehabilitation are, in fact, true, they amount to too little, too late to persuade the Court that a guideline sentence is sufficient to protect the public.

points out in its sentencing memorandum, the

Court should not give much weight to an eleventh hour

assertion of remorse as any prisoner in his shoes would be

willing to do the same, and even considering the letters

that he drafted to his family from prison, which he now

asserts show his genuine remorse, one of those letters

hints at blaming the FBI undercover employee for his

predicament, stating that the whole situation was because

he wanted to get married.

Along these lines, the Court also considers the defendant's argument in his sentencing memorandum and at

the sentencing hearing that he was essentially entrapped by the undercover employee to make incriminating statements that he did not really meant to -- in order to impress the informant -- but which he really meant to impress the informant whom he believed was ready to commit jihad because her husband had been killed in Syria by anti-ISIS forces, and that another family member was killed by Shiite ISIS forces in Iran.

There is a significant problem with this argument. Abu-Rayyan began viewing and expressing his support of ISIL terrorist activities at least a full year before the informant entered the picture. Prior to contact with the undercover employee, he attempted buy the gun at issue here, went to the shooting range firing an AK-47, and then posted pictures of himself with the AK-47, and the caption sahwat hunting.

Prior to contact with the undercover employee, the defendant sent his brother a text message, including a beheading photograph, and announcing that this would be a perfect time to do an istishhadi.

While it is true that he begged the undercover employee not to hurt herself, he also discussed with her his plan to shoot up a church and assassinate a police officer.

As the government aptly points out, the defendant

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may claim he made the disturbing statements merely to impress the undercover employee, but anyone who has been victimized by such an attack would find his ideas far from impressive.

The Court is also persuaded by the government's argument that the guideline range does not reflect the threat that he poses to public safety. The guidelines range in this case is based solely on possessing guns while addicted to marijuana.

So part of this Court's consideration of the sentencing factors directs the Court to consider whether a given sentence will afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and as the Sixth Circuit has observed, it is a defendant's sentence, as much as his conviction or negative publicity that provides deterrence. Deterring those who are contemplating terrorist activities is vindicated by imposing an above guideline sentence here.

While many terrorists may be contemplating their own martyrdom operation, as the defendant was in this case, sending the public a message that even the first steps towards committing acts of terrorism may -- will carry serious consequences, may then deter those planning such operations from doing so. If the defendant is sentenced to a little over a year, as he seeks the Court -- as he requests the Court to do, the Court would

be sending a message that those who take initial steps, as in this case, will face only a slight jail term, and then will be quickly release so they can try it again.

The defendant argues that the time he has spent in prison is sufficient to deter him from participating in conduct that has put him in the predicament in which he now finds himself. Whether or not the defendant has been sufficiently deterred from repeating his criminal conduct however, that is only one part of the equation.

The other part is whether others are sufficiently deterred, the concept known as general deterrence, and given the conduct at issue here, the Court finds that a 15 month sentence simply is not sufficient to deter others from engaging in similar criminal conduct.

Another factor that the Court considers, of course, is the seriousness of the offense. Here, the defendant pled guilty to making a false statement to acquire a firearm in violation of the statute, and possessing a firearm by a prohibitive person. These violations were based on the defendant's admitted use of marijuana, and his lying about it on the ATF form, and his illegal possession of a gun while using marijuana. The defendant blames his marijuana habit for making him depress and impeding his judgment.

In fact, he claims his addiction to marijuana, in

addition to his immaturity and depression, caused him to support ISIS terrorist activities and to discuss with the undercover employee shooting up a church, and killing the police officer who arrested him. Under the circumstances where he was causing marijuana while buying and possessing a firearm, while viewing and positively commenting on gruesome ISIS terrorist activities like beheadings, burning people alive, his crime becomes much more serious than if he was just buying a gun for personal protection as he argued he was doing at sentence.

When the Court considers all of the facts surrounding the defendant's illegal purchase and possession of a gun while heavily using marijuana, his crimes are a matter of significant seriousness. The most compelling aggravating factor in assessing the seriousness of his offense, is that shortly after he was arrested, he attempted to buy another firearm and went to the firing range, practicing the use of an AK-47, and then posted pictures of himself holding the AK-47. Given his conducts, his illegal possession of a firearm and his false denial of his marijuana use to acquire a firearm, are serious offenses requiring a significant upward variance from the guideline sentence, especially because these behaviors occurred while the defendant was engaged in the threatening conversations discussed above.

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Finally, Section 3553(a) instructs the Court to consider providing the defendant with needed educational, vocational training, medical care, other correctional treatment in the most effective way. The Court is mindful, however, as the defendant points out, that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.

Both Dr. Danuloff and Dr. Tillbrook recommended mental health counseling. The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report noted that the defendant has a significant substance abuse history, for which treatment may be beneficial. The Court may recommend that the defendant receive mental health and substance abuse treatment while incarcerated, and in this way may improve the expectation that the defendant can be safely released into the community at a future day.

The defendant seeks to rely on two Rule 11 plea agreements, one filed in this district, the other an unfiled document which, until introduced at the sentencing hearing, was not a matter of public record.

The defendant argues these plea agreements support the imposition of a guideline sentence here in order for this defendant to be sentenced in parity with those sentenced for criminal -- for similar crimes.

The government responds that this Court cannot

rely on those Rule 11 plea agreements in determining an appropriate sentence here, as the Court simply does not have enough facts regarding those agreements before it.

As the government points out, those plea agreements may be based on many factors, like the inadmissibility of evidence, the unavailability of witnesses, whether the defendant was facing deportation, whether new case law impeded prosecution, whether exculpatory evidence existed, and whether the defendant was cooperating.

Based upon the plethora of information that might have informed those plea agreements, for which the parties and the Court are not privy, those plea agreements are not relevant, and do not form a basis for the Court's sentencing decision in this case.

After the sentencing hearing in this case, defense counsel filed an addendum under seal. The Court refers to that addendum here without sealing this order as there is no reason why the matter should not be a matter of public record, and in that addendum, defense states that the record in the case of United States versus Gregerson, 16-20552, now indicates that the plea agreement in that case pending before Judge Tarnow did not involve cooperation by the defendant. True or not, the plea agreement in Gregerson has no bearing on this matter. He

is not a co-defendant here, and is not charged with the same crimes.

At oral argument, the defendant argued that his conduct was protected by the First Amendment, and cited United States versus Shehadeh. Shehadeh does not support the argument that a guidelines sentence is warranted here.

In that case the jury convicted Shehadeh of three counts of making materially false statements to government agents, and for lying repeatedly to federal agents about his attempt to travel to Pakistan in 2008 to join a violent insurgent group of Islamist terrorists.

At sentencing, the Court granted upward variance from the guidelines range because of the seriousness of his conduct which involved attempting to join the army, while stating that his intention to -- stating his intention to two friends that he was doing so to join violent -- a violent international jihad, and to gun down his comrades.

It is true, as the defense quoted at trial, the sentencing judge in that case specifically noted that the Court does not find the fact that Shehadeh created and administered websites regurgitating certain jihadist propaganda to be an appropriate basis for punishment consistent with the First Amendment, but the defendant's statements to his friends about his evil intentions to

commit jihad, combined with the steps that he took towards that end by attempting to join the army was sufficient to support an upward variance. Although the sentencing guidelines called for a sentence of 63 to 78 months in that case, the court imposed an above guideline sentence of 156 months, amounting to approximately eight years over and above the advisory range.

Like Shehadeh, here the sentencing variance is not based on the defendant's mere trolling of ISIS propaganda, but it's based on the fact that he was posting and stating his support of ISIS terrorist activity at the same time he was purchasing a gun, attempting to purchase another gun, practicing shooting at the firing range, posting pictures of himself, and at the same time telling the undercover employee that he wanted to shoot up the church and kill the police officer while officer was in the hospital.

This is not merely viewing or maintaining an ISIS website, as the Shehadeh court found was insufficient, standing alone, to support an upward variance. Rather, this is the sort of serious conduct that the Shehadeh court found was sufficient to vary upwards to give an above guideline sentence.

The Supreme Court has held that a defendant may be the subject -- may be subject to an enhanced sentence because his crime is based on the race of his victim, and

has rejected arguments that such consideration penalizes offensive thought in violation of the defendant's First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has observed that the First Amendment does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.

So too here. It is appropriate for the Court to consider the Twitter tweets, the ISIS propaganda downloaded to his cell phone, which included the wallpaper on his phone, the severed head of a woman in that photo, as it informs the Court's consideration of what he may have intended when he purchased and attempted to purchase a firearm, when he practiced shooting military type weapons, when he told his brother that he wanted to participate in a martyrdom operation, and when he expressed his plans to murder innocent victims to the undercover employee.

As the Supreme Court has noted, a defendant's membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group may be relevant to the determination, and to whether that defendant will be dangerous in the future.

While defense counsel is correct that the First

Amendment may protect the mere viewing and dissemination

of ISIS propaganda, when that viewing is combined with

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conduct suggesting an intention to carry out jihadist activities, the Court is well within its realm when it considers those background facts to inform its determination of defendant's motives and intent.

Finally, the Court considers the defense counsel's argument made a sentencing on March 13th, that the government waived its argument for an upward variance because the government did not file formal objections to Pre-Sentence Investigation Report recommending a guideline sentence. Notice that the government is seeking an upward variance is sufficient when set forth in the government's prehearing submission as provided by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure at 32(h). The notice need not be in formal objections to the PSR, notice in a sentencing memorandum will suffice, as decided in United States versus Gleason, at 277 Federal Appendix 536 at Page 543, a Sixth Circuit case in 2008, affirming an upward variance based on bad conduct after the offense discussed in the government's sentencing memorandum.

The government filed a sentencing memorandum on March 2, 2017 seeking an upward variance and asking for the sentence of 96 months. The defendant responded to that memorandum at two sentencing hearings, the first held on the 13th of March, and the second two weeks later on March 27th. Those two hearings span nearly four hours.

The defense counsel spoke at great length at both. In addition to his thorough sentencing memorandum and argument at the two sentencing hearings, defense counsel also submitted an addendum in support of his sentencing memorandum on March 20, 2017, which the Court has considered.

Under all of these circumstances, the defendant had sufficient notice that the government intended to seek an upward variance. There's no prejudice to the defendant because notice was given in that memorandum rather than in objections to the PSR.

In reaching its decision today, the Court recognizes that the advisory range is 15 to 21 months, and that this range still serves as grounding for the specific period to be chosen by the Court in determining the length of confinement. The defendant's significant work history, strong family support, the expressions of abject remorse supports the idea that a sentence can be effective to accomplish the purposes of Section 3553(a) with a period that is less than that asked for by the government, but significantly more than that advocated by the defendant.

In sum, the above guidelines sentence in this case is no greater than necessary, and will be sufficient to realize the objectives of Section 3553(a) to protect the public, deter the criminal conduct, and to recognize

the seriousness of the offense.

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Accordingly, and pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Court, in considering the guidelines and the factors contained at Section 3553(a), will commit the defendant to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 60 months on both Counts 1 and 2 concurrently.

Upon release from prison, the defendant will be placed on a term of supervised release for a period of three years on each count, also to be served concurrently.

The Court will waive the imposition of a fine, cost of confinement, and the cost of supervision given his lack of resources.

It is further ordered that the defendant shall pay a special assessment in the amount of \$200.00, which is due immediately.

Mandatory drug testing provision is ordered.

While on supervision, the defendant shall -well, actually during his term of confinement, the Court
will recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that he be
confined at a facility offering both mental health and
substance abuse treatment while in custody, and as it
relates to the substance abuse treatment, the Court will
recommend specifically the 500 hour comprehensive drug
treatment program.

During his supervision, the Court will also adopt all of the standard conditions of supervision that have been adopted by the Eastern District of Michigan, and the following special conditions due to the nature of the offense, and defendant's substance abuse and mental health issues.

The defendant shall first, not use or possess alcohol in any consumable form, nor shall he be in the social company of anyone whom he knows to be in possession of alcohol or illegal drugs, or frequent an establishment where alcohol is served for consumption on the premises with the exception of restaurants.

The defendant will be ordered to participate in a program approved by Probation for substance abuse, which may include testing to make sure that he has not reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol.

The defendant shall participate in a program approved by Probation for mental health counseling which may include anger management.

The defendant will be required to take all medications prescribed by a physician, and whose care he is under, including a psychiatrist in the doses and at the times proposed. If the defendant is prescribed medication, he shall take it, and the defendant shall not discontinue his medication without medical advice.

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Anything else that you believe sentence ought to include Ms. Connelly?

MS. CONNELLY: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Waterstreet?

MR. WATERSTREET: Your Honor, as to one other condition, perhaps supervised release, would be his limitation on internet use. It's commonly used in the child exploitation cases where the Court can order that the defendant be limited to only one account, and that account can be limited to what items he can view.

His problems arose as a result of his viewing things that the Court deemed to be frightening, and so there are certain factors under supervised release that he can use solely for legal search, outside employment, specific assignments of educational institutions, type email messages without electronic files or images embedded in them, and he can only have access through one internet capable device, and he shall provide the probation officer with accurate information concerning the computer system, and the ip address.

It's a way to be monitor him so that we're not back several years down the road making the same arguments that he was depressed, and started following the same line of documents.

THE COURT: Mr. Shanker, do you have

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opposition to that?

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MR. SHANKER: Well, your Honor, if this provision were to be added, I would just request that the Probation Department have the discretion to say at some point, I don't think we need to monitor that anymore, because I don't it want to inhibit his ability to go to school or to work or things like that that are going to help him in many other ways.

So, you know, I see -- I hear what the government is saying, and I can understand that condition being imposed, but I would just like to make sure that there is this discretion to the probation officer that, you know, maybe he can go the probation officer, and say this condition is not going to work for me, but maybe we can do this, just some kind of discretion.

THE COURT: I think that makes sense. So we will include the provision with an indication that it shall be a condition as long as the Probation Department feels it necessary to maintain some kind of supervisory monitoring.

Any objections for the record that have not been voiced previously, Mr. Waterstreet?

MR. WATERSTREET: Not another objection, your Honor, but just as a point of order. There was a condition that the defendant agreed to forfeiture of

items, and there was an amended stipulated order of 1 2 forfeiture on March 13, 2017 that was ordered by the 3 Court. I know that oftentimes in the sentencing, the 4 court talks about fine, restitution and forfeiture. I 5 6 just want to make sure that forfeiture is made part of 7 sentencing in this particular matter as well. 8 THE COURT: All right. So we need to enter a 9 final order? 10 MR. WATERSTREET: Yes, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Any objection to that, Mr. 12 Shanker? 13 MR. SHANKER: Your Honor, I don't have any 14 objection to what Mr. Abu-Rayyan has already signed and 15 agreed to. So I don't have any problem with that aspect of it. 16 17 I do just want to make sure that the family gets 18 their computers back, because they got all of that 19 equipment, and they have been waiting, and I think it's only fair that they get that back now as soon as possible. 20 21 MR. WATERSTREET: The forfeiture is not 22 concerned with the computers. It is the firearm and the 23 ammunition. 24 MR. SHANKER: No objection.

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THE COURT: Do you have any objection

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directing the return of those items that belong to the 1 2 family members? 3 MR. WATERSTREET: Once I make sure that all the evidentiary items are taken care of, I have no problem 4 with the return. 5 6 THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. 7 Shanker? 8 MR. SHANKER: Well, as far as objections go, your Honor, there was a lot said today in this order, and 9 10 I would like to get a transcript and review it, but I 11 would maintain the objections and arguments that I made 12 before, but I do want to take a look at the transcript 13 before I make any final -- if there are any additional objections. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. That would be achievable, although Mr. DiBartolomeo is in the middle of a trial, and 16 17 he as been having to provide daily copies. So I'm not 18 sure how long it will take, but we'll allow you to file 19 those objections when you -- within how many days of receiving the transcripts? 20 21 MR. SHANKER: Two weeks. 22 THE COURT: Okay. That would be great.

MR. WATERSTREET: So I take that as to be his Bostic statement, that the Court is giving him two weeks

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Mr. Waterstreet?

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to file a Bostic statement, is that my understanding? 1 2 THE COURT: Yes, I think that's what it 3 means. MR. WATERSTREET: Okay. I just want to make 4 5 sure. 6 And then the other thing, your Honor, the 7 defendant did not enter into a Rule 11 plea agreement. He 8 still has appellate rights. 9 THE COURT: Right. I was just about to get 10 there. 11 MR. WATERSTREET: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: So Mr. Abu-Rayyan, you should be 13 advised that you have a right to appeal the conviction and 14 sentence imposed by the Court --15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: -- in this case. In order to do 16 17 so, you have act within the next 14 days by notifying the 18 clerk of the court of your desire to pursue an appeal. 19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: In the meantime, I know you're, 21 of course, not overly excited about the term that you're 22 ordered to serve. There is a lot of programming in 23 federal system that is available to people who have issues 24 as you've had in the past, and that programming can

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assist, I think, in helping you avoid making mistakes like

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this in the future, if you want to take advantage of those programs, and one of them is the substance abuse program. There's also mental health treatment, including anger management, that is available, and I think would be of real help to you.

I've been impressed. I was impressed with your statement made at the last hearing, but obviously -- I mean, obviously, you have some issues that need to be resolved in order for you to have a more fulfilling life, and for the Court to be comfortable that's you're not coming out in the same condition that you went in, and that you can provide some comfort to the people in the community that you will be behave in a way that is safe.

So I would recommend those programs to you. Look up what there is, and signed up for as much as you can sign up for, okay? And I will wish you good luck, sir.

MR. SHANKER: Your Honor, I did want to get a recommendation from your Honor on -- he's requesting Milan, and if he does not qualify for that facility, then Pekin FCI in Illinois.

THE COURT: Okay. I think Milan has both mental health and comprehensive drug program, right?

MS. CONNELLY: I know it has a drug program.

I'm not sure as to mental health. What was the second facility?

1	MR. SHANKER: Pekin.
2	THE COURT: Should I make that recommendation
3	as an alternative?
4	MR. SHANKER: Yes.
5	THE COURT: Okay. I'll be happy to do that.
6	MR. SHANKER: And the other thing is that the
7	notice of appeal is due within 14 days, but I will be
8	filing objections or maybe within 14 days of receipt of
9	the transcript. So would you just want us to file for and
10	extension of time to file the notice of appeal?
11	THE COURT: Yes, you perfect those appellate
12	rights as you see fit.
13	MR. SHANKER: Thank you, your Honor.
14	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well then, the
15	Court will order that the sentence be imposed as stated on
16	the record, and again, I wish you good luck.
17	THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor.
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19	(Proceedings concluded.)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, official court reporter for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause on the date hereinbefore set forth.

I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction.

Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, CSR Official Court Reporter

Date

13 Official Court Reporter